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INTRODUCTION
In Bayesian probability theory, (1, 2) probabilities are not objective states of nature, but rather are taken to be degrees of belief that determine an agent's decisions in the face of uncertainty. It can be shown that degrees of belief must obey the usual rules of the probability calculus if the agent's decisions are rational (for references and a summary of the argument, see Ref. 3) . In a Bayesian framework, probabilities and measured frequencies are strictly separate concepts. This leads to conceptual clarity in statements that involve both probabilities and frequencies. Furthermore, adopting the Bayesian viewpoint has important practical consequences in the field of statistics. (2, 4) If the Bayesian interpretation is applied to quantum mechanical probabilities, one is led naturally to the viewpoint that quantum states represent states of belief. This viewpoint is attractive for many reasons. For instance, it eliminates the difficulties associated with regarding quantum state collapse as a real physical process. Within the Bayesian framework, one can account effortlessly for the tight connection between measured frequencies and the probabilities obtained from the quantum probability rule.
(5) The Bayesian approach has led to new mathematical results, (3, 6) a better understanding of prior information in quantum tomography, (7) and an optimized entanglement purification protocol. (8) Hardy (9) (see also Ref. 10) has recently given a derivation of the mathematical structure of quantum theory from five simple axioms. In his first axiom, Hardy identifies probability with measured frequency in the limit of an infinite number of repetitions of a given experiment. In Hardy's formulation, a quantum state is a property of a preparation device. This is a problematical notion. Attempts to base probability theory on a definition of probability as frequency in infinite ensembles (11) have largely failed (see, e.g., Refs. 12 and 13). For instance, without further complicating assumptions, a relative frequency specified for an infinite ensemble does not in any way restrict the corresponding frequency for a finite subensemble. Furthermore, attaching the notion of a quantum state to a preparation device appears to limit quantum theory to the description of laboratory experiments. But surely one would want to assign a quantum state, e.g., to a light pulse arriving from a distant star.
The details of Hardy's mathematical proof turn out to be mostly independent of the specific assumptions of his first axiom. In the present paper, we show that it is indeed possible to reformulate Hardy's derivation in such a way that the axioms refer to Bayesian probabilities for the outcomes of measurements performed on a single physical system (see also Hardy's remarks at the end of Sec. 6.1 of Ref. 9). In Sec. 2, we briefly review Hardy's basic setup and axioms. In Sec. 3, we provide a Bayesian reformulation of the problem and explain how Hardy's proof can be modified accordingly. In Sec. 4, we conclude by showing how the connection between probabilities and measured frequencies is recovered in our formulation.
HARDY'S SETUP
In Ref. 9, Hardy considers the following situation. An experimenter has a preparation device, a transformation device, and a measurement device. Associated with each preparation is a state, ''defined to be (that thing represented by) any mathematical object that can be used to determine the probability associated with the outcomes of any measurement that may be performed on a system prepared by the given preparation.'' If a physical system is incident on the measurement device, it outputs a number l, where l=1,..., L. If no physical system is incident on the measurement device, it outputs the number 0.
Hardy then defines a probability measurement in the following way. A given measurement is performed on an ensemble of n systems each prepared by a given preparation device. Then the number of times, n + , is recorded that a particular outcome l 1 , or subset of outcomes S 1 ı {1,..., L}, is observed. The measured probability is then defined as
It is then assumed that there exists a minimum number, K, of appropriately chosen probability measurements that completely specify the state of the system. These K probabilities can be represented by a column vector
which represents the state. The result of any probability measurement can be inferred from the vector p. The number K is called the number of degrees of freedom of the system. It follows from the axioms below that the set of states is convex; pure states are defined as the extremal points of this convex set. Finally, the dimension, N, of the system is defined as the maximum number of states that can be distinguished reliably in a single-shot measurement. Using these terms, Hardy derives the usual Hilbert-space formulation of quantum theory from the following five axioms, quoted verbatim from Ref. 9. Axiom 1. Probabilities. Relative frequencies (measured by taking the proportion of times a particular outcome is observed) tend to the same value (which we call the probability) for any case where a given measurement is performed on a ensemble of n systems prepared by some given preparation in the limit as n becomes infinite. 
Axiom 5.
Continuity. There exists a continuous reversible transformation on a system between any two pure states of that system. These axioms are stated in a manifestly frequentist language. Axiom 1 defines probability in terms of limiting frequency, and the number of degrees of freedom K, defined explicitly in terms of frequency measurements, has a central position in both Axioms 2 and 4. Nevertheless, a Bayesian formulation of Hardy's program turns out to be straightforward.
THE BAYESIAN SETUP
The Bayesian setup we are about to describe differs from Hardy's setup in the following ways. In the Bayesian formulation, it will not be necessary to refer to preparation devices or ensembles. Everything is expressed in terms of single physical systems. The concept of a probability measurement is not needed (see Ref. 6 for a Bayesian account of what it means to effectively measure a quantum probability in a laboratory experiment). Axiom 1 can be eliminated.
Our primitives are physical systems, transformation devices, and measurement devices. As before, the non-null outcomes of a measurement device are labeled l=1,..., L. We define a special class of measurements, socalled yes-no measurements, that have only two outcomes, which we label yes and no. E.g., for a given measurement device, the questions ''is the outcome equal to l 1 ?'' and ''is the outcome in the set S 1 ı {1,..., L}?'' define yes-no measurements.
The state of a system is now defined to be any mathematical object that summarizes a physicist's state of belief about a system in that it can be used to determine the probabilities associated with the outcomes of any measurement that may be performed on the system. In this definition, probability means the physicist's degree of belief about the outcome of a measurement performed on a single system. Degrees of belief acquire an operational definition in decision theory and can be shown to obey the usual probability rules (see Ref. 3 
for details and references).
We now assume that there exists a number of yes-no measurements such that the probabilities for their outcomes determine the state fully. Let K be the minimum number of such yes-no measurements, and fix a set of K such measurements, the fiducial measurements. As before, the state is then given by the probabilities assigned to the yes outcomes of the fiducial measurements, i.e. , by a vector p=(p 1 ,..., p K ) T . For any yes-no measurement there exists a function f that maps any state p to the probability for the yes outcome if the measurement is performed on a system to which p is assigned. This can be expressed as Pr(yes)=f(p).
Finally, as before, the dimension, N, of the system is defined as the maximum number of states that can be distinguished reliably in a single measurement. It turns out that most parts of Hardy's proof are unaffected by our reformulation. (14) Wherever Hardy refers to a probability measurement, we refer instead to ''probability assigned to the yes outcome of a yes-no measurement.'' The only exception is the part of the proof that uses Axiom 1 explicitly, i.e., Secs. 6.4 and 6.5 of Ref. 9 .
Section 6.4 of Ref. 9 introduces the function f defined above, and derives the inequality 0 [ f(p) [ 1 from the assumption that probabilities are measured frequencies. We get this inequality from the assumption that the probabilities assigned by a physicist are degrees of belief and therefore obey the laws of probability. Since
It is worth pointing out that the Bayesian derivation of this inequality does not depend on the notion of repeated trials and is therefore completely independent of the frequentist derivation. Section 6.5 of Ref. 9 introduces the idea of a mixture of two quantum states, which is then used to derive linearity of the quantum probability rule and quantum transformations. Hardy defines a mixture as an ensemble consisting of a fraction l of systems prepared in a state p A and a fraction 1 − l of systems prepared in a state p B . This construction cannot be used in our Bayesian approach, which refers only to a single system, not a large ensemble of systems. In particular, in the Bayesian approach, the mixing parameter l cannot be interpreted as a limiting frequency of systems prepared in a particular way. A different proof of linearity is therefore required.
Our alternative derivation of linearity is based on the idea of conditioning, which is central to Bayesian theory in general. Assume that p A and p B are possible states for a given system. Then we can imagine a situation in which a physicist's state assignment depends on some event E. The event E could be the outcome of a previous measurement, or some other piece of information that affects his state assignments. If he knew that E was true, he would make the state assignment p A , and if he knew that ¬ E was true, he would make the state assignment p B . We now assume that he does not know the truth value of E. Instead, he assigns the probabilities Pr(E)=l and Pr( ¬ E)=1 − l to the events E and ¬ E, and makes the state assignment p C .
If we now apply the function f for a given yes-no measurement to the state p A , we obtain the conditional probability for the outcome yes, given that E is true,
Applying f to the state p B gives the conditional probability for the outcome yes, given that ¬ E is true,
Finally, applying f to the state p C gives the unconditional probability for the outcome yes,
Since we have assumed that the physicist's probability assignments are Bayesian degrees of belief, they must obey the usual probability rules (see above). In particular, they obey the law of total probability, Pr(yes)=Pr(yes | E) Pr(E)+Pr(yes | ¬ E) Pr( ¬ E).
By substituting Eqs. (4) (5) (6) and the definition of l, we obtain 
which can be combined with Eq. (8) to give
This establishes convex linearity of the function f. 
DISCUSSION
In the previous section, we have seen that most of Hardy's derivation of quantum theory remains valid if probabilities are given a Bayesian interpretation. In the Bayesian formulation, Hardy's frequentist Axiom 1 can be omitted. Linearity now follows from the basic setup, where quantum states are defined as compendia of probabilities for the outcomes of arbitrary single-shot yes-no measurements. In this sense, quantum theory can be derived from the last four of Hardy's five axioms.
It may seem, however, that something important is lost in the Bayesian approach. Hardy's version of quantum theory makes statements about actual frequencies measured in a laboratory, which are conspicuously absent from the Bayesian formulation given above. We will now review an almost trivial argument that establishes a tight connection between Bayesian quantum state assignments and measured frequencies.
Suppose an experiment consisting of the preparation of a system and a subsequent yes-no measurement is repeated n times. Assume that the experimenter assigns the n-fold tensor product state r é n -r é r é · · · é r (11) to the n copies of the system, where r is a single-system density operator. Suppose the single-system measurement is described by the projection operators P yes and P no =1 − P yes . The probability for yes in the first measurement is then q -Pr(yes)=tr(rP yes ). The probability for k yes outcomes and n − k no outcomes in n repetitions of the experiment is easily found to be
which for large n is strongly peaked near k/n=q. The probability that the measured frequency is near q approaches 1 as n tends to infinity. The Bayesian starting point of regarding probability and measured frequency as two separate concepts thus leads to a transparent and tight connection between quantum states and measured frequencies. Nothing is lost by abandoning the a priori identification of probabilities with measured frequencies.
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